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Seventh	 Circuit,	 home	 of	 former	 Judge	 Richard	 Posner,	 the	 “Chicago	
School,”	and	analysis	based	on	markets	and	economics.1	It	thus	comes	as	
a	surprise	that	in	college-athletics	cases,	the	court	has	replaced	economic	
analysis	with	 legal	 formalisms.	 In	adopting	a	deferential	approach	that	
would	uphold	nearly	every	rule	the	National	Collegiate	Athletic	Associa-
tion	(NCAA)	claims	 is	 related	 to	amateurism,	 the	court	recalls	 the	pre-
Chicago	School	era,	in	which	courts	aggressively	applied	“per	se”	illegality	











The	Seventh	Circuit’s	 ruling	suffered	 from	four	critical	 flaws.	First,	
the	court	misread	antitrust	precedent,	relying	on	dicta	from	a	decades-







nomics	movement	 in	antitrust	 law);	see	also	 John	H.	Langbein,	Trust	Law	as	Regulatory	
Law:	The	Unum/Provident	Scandal	and	Judicial	Review	of	Benefit	Denials	Under	ERISA,	101	












Seventh	Circuit	 ignored	 the	procedural	 setting	 of	 a	motion	 to	dismiss,	
making	up	facts	benefiting	the	defendant	rather	than—as	hornbook	law	















quantity	of	 television	rights	available	 for	sale,	 the	challenged	practices	
create	a	limitation	on	output,”	which	prior	cases	had	made	clear	are	“un-
reasonable	 restraints	 of	 trade.”8	 Exacerbating	 the	 situation,	 the	 lower	
court	had	found	that	“the	minimum	aggregate	price	 in	 fact	operates	to	












































	 11.	 Id.	at	101.	The	need	for	some	restrictions	 for	the	product	to	be	available	may	
explain	why	per	se	illegality	is	not	appropriate,	but	does	not	justify	analysis	more	deferen-
tial	 than	 the	Rule	of	Reason.	The	college	sports	 industry,	with	more	 than	$12	billion	 in	
annual	revenue,	does	not	need	insulation	from	antitrust	liability.	Tom	Gerencer,	How	Much	
Money	 Does	 the	 NCAA	 Make?,	 MONEYNATION	 (Mar.	 22,	 2016),	 https://moneyna-
tion.com/how-much-money-does-the-ncaa-make/	 [https://perma.cc/5WAZ-2UGM].	
Such	deference	would	carry	great	risks,	as	NCAA	members	are	more	than	capable	of	en-


































enth	 Circuit	 relied	 on	Board	 of	 Regents	 dicta	 to	 conclude	 that	 the	 re-
strictions	were	procompetitive	because	they	“serve	to	maintain	the	clear	
line	 of	 demarcation	between	 college	 and	professional	 football.”21	On	 a	
motion	to	dismiss,	the	court	refused	to	interpret	the	facts	in	favor	of	the	
plaintiff,	 worrying	 that	 “the	 cold	 commercial	 nature	 of	 professional	
sports	would	not	only	destroy	the	amateur	status	of	college	athletics	but	















































misapplied	 Board	 of	 Regents	 dicta,	 stating	 that	 “the	 Supreme	 Court	
seemed	to	create	a	presumption	in	favor	of	certain	NCAA	rules”	in	its	as-
sertion	that	“most	of	the	regulatory	controls	of	the	NCAA	are	.	.	.	procom-












Players	 on	 Jersey	 Sales,	 CNBC	 (Dec.	 22,	 2011,	 4:21	 PM),	
https://www.cnbc.com/id/45768248	[https://perma.cc/H9MA-NRF5].	
	 28.	 Note	by	Harry	Blackmun,	Justice,	United	States	Supreme	Court,	on	Preliminary	


























services	 of	 athletic	 recruits	 by	 offering	 them	 scholarships	 and	 various	
amenities,	such	as	coaching	and	facilities.”37	And	it	is	consistent	with	the	
district	court’s	finding	in	the	case	that	less	competitive	divisions,	“colle-
giate	 athletics	 associations,	 or	 minor	 and	 foreign	 professional	 sports	
leagues”	are	not	“potential	substitutes.”38	
Finally,	 in	 2018,	 the	 Seventh	 Circuit	 in	 Deppe	 affirmed	 the	 lower	
court’s	 grant	of	 a	motion	 to	dismiss	 against	 a	 challenge	 to	 the	NCAA’s	
year-in-residence	rule.39	The	court	found	that	the	rule	was	related	to	ath-

















personal	 or	 family	 circumstances	or	other	 extenuating	 circumstances.”	Deppe	v.	NCAA,	
893	F.3d	498,	499–500	(7th	Cir.	2018).	
96 Michigan Law Review Online [Vol. 117:90 




In	 short,	 each	 of	 the	 three	 Seventh	 Circuit	 rulings	 deferred	 exces-
sively	to	NCAA	restrictions,	pointing	to	lines	of	demarcation,	unduly	em-












































precedent	 to	avoid	 the	burden-shifting	analysis	by	asserting	 that	a	 re-































	 47.	 Contra	 Deppe	 v.	NCAA,	 893	 F.3d	 498,	 501	 (7th	 Cir.	 2018)	 (quoting	Agnew	 v.	
NCAA,	683	F.3d	328,	342–43	(7th	Cir.	2012)).	
	 48.	 Contra	id.	at	503–04.	















































	 54.	 See	 Alex	 Kirshner,	 NCAA	 Transfer	 Rules,	 Explained	 Quickly	 and	 Honestly,	
SBNATION	 (May	 9,	 2018,	 8:08	 AM),	 https://www.sbnation.com/college-foot-
ball/2018/5/9/17311748/ncaa-transfer-rules-change-guide-list-sit-out	
[https://perma.cc/TK7D-G4MZ].	
April 2019] College Athletics 99 


























rules	 are	 presumptively	 procompetitive.61	 This	 is	 not	 a	 proper	 legal	
standard.62	But	even	if	it	were,	it	would	still	not	be	appropriate	for	the	
court	to	apply	these	facts	at	the	motion-to-dismiss	stage,	as	the	plaintiff	
alleged	that	 “[t]he	year-in-residence	requirement	 functions	as	 [an	eco-
nomic]	 penalty	 imposed	.	.	.	 for	 switching	 schools”	 and	 the	 “NCAA’s	
 
	 55.	 See	 supra	 notes	 49–50	 and	 accompanying	 text;	 see	 also	 Jay	 Bilas,	 Solving	 the	
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proffered	 academic	motivations	 for	 the	 year-in-residence	 requirement	
are	 instead	 a	 pretext	 for	 the	 true	 economic	 motivations	 behind	 the	









Another	 purported	 “fact”	 that	 the	 Seventh	 Circuit	 improperly	
adopted	was	the	assumption	that	overturning	the	year-in-residence	rule	
would	result	in	student-athletes	“be[ing]	‘traded’	from	year	to	year	like	
professional	 athletes,”	 as	 they	 “could	begin	 the	 season	playing	 for	one	
school	and	end	the	season	playing	for	a	rival.”64	Such	an	assertion,	how-
ever,	contravenes	the	pleadings,	the	NCAA	manual,	and	common	sense.	
In	professional	 sports,	 “trading”	 is	a	business	 transaction	 in	which	
owners	 exchange	 players	 (technically,	 player	 employment	 contracts)	
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reassigned	by	any	assignee	Club)	to	any	other	Club	in	accordance	with	
the	 Major	 League	 Rules.”67	 To	 state	 the	 obvious,	 no	 such	 assignment	
clause	appears	in	the	NCAA	national	letter	of	intent68	or	any	other	pur-
ported	NCAA	governance	document.	
Finally,	 common	 sense	 dictates	 that	 lifting	 the	 NCAA	 year-in-resi-
dence	rule	would	not	result	in	NCAA	schools	revising	their	national	letter	










the	 rule’s	 effects	 in	 enhancing	 revenue,	 restraining	 costs,	 or	 deterring	
players	from	transferring	from	the	NCAA’s	most	powerful	schools.71	In-
stead,	the	court	simply	stipulated	that	the	NCAA’s	restrictions	bore	the	
“innocent	 explanation”	 that	 the	 athletes	 covered	 by	 the	 rule	 “are	 pre-
cisely	[those]	who	are	most	vulnerable	to	poaching.”72	
The	Seventh	Circuit	implied	that	its	conclusions	were	obvious	by	re-
jecting	 the	 need	 for	 economic	 analysis	 in	 favor	 of	 presuming	 that	 the	
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that	recruited	the	player,	a	better	academic	fit,	or	the	availability	of	an	
athletics	grant-in-aid	on	more	favorable	terms.”74	The	rule	also	would	ap-






colleges	 with	 high	 academic	 standards	 because	 players	 with	 strong	
grades	are	deterred	from	transferring	since	they	do	not	want	to	sit	out	
for	a	year.	












coaches	 was	 so	 anticompetitive	 that	 it	 violated	 antitrust	 law	 under	 a	
“quick	look”	analysis.78	There,	as	in	Mackey,	the	court	recognized	that	re-
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dicta.	It	manufactured	wholly	new	antitrust	precedent,	abandoning	the	
Rule	of	Reason	and	emphasis	on	consumer	welfare.	And	it	made	up	facts	
and	 economic	 conclusions.	 These	 errors	 led	 to	 the	 upholding	 of	 a	 re-
straint	that	could	harm	student-athletes,	colleges,	and	sports	fans.80	The	
court	committed	the	sin	cautioned	against	in	Board	of	Regents:	applying	
unsupported	rigid	rules	rather	than	considering	a	market’s	economic	re-
alities.	The	Seventh	Circuit	would	benefit	from	returning	to	its	law	and	
economics	roots.	
 
	 80.	 For	an	analysis	of	how	overturning	NCAA	restraints	can	enhance	consumer	wel-
fare	even	among	fans,	see,	for	example,	Thomas	A.	Baker	III,	Marc	Edelman	&	Nicholas	M.	
Watanabe,	Debunking	the	NCAA’s	Myth	That	Amateurism	Conforms	with	Antitrust	Law:	A	
Legal	and	Statistical	Analysis,	85	TENN.	L.	REV.	661,	662,	697–99	(2018)	(showing	that	over-
turning	aspects	of	NCAA	rule	denying	compensation	to	student-athletes	increased,	or	at	a	
minimum	maintained,	game	attendance).	
